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ORIGINALISM, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, AND SUPREME
COURT DECISION MAKING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: EXPLAINING LAWRENCE V. TEXAS†
RONALD KAHN*
One way to explore the relationship between originalism and the
living Constitution at the turn of the twenty-first century is to consider
why a conservative/moderate Supreme Court in a conservative era
chose to extend, in a non-minimalist way, the rights of privacy and
personhood to gay men and lesbians in Lawrence v. Texas,1 thereby
overturning Bowers v. Hardwick,2 a case in which the Supreme Court
refused to consider the possibility of such rights.  To understand why
this occurred, one must explore the role of what I will call the Social
Construction Process (SCP) in non-originalist decision making—and
the opposition to it by the originalist jurists on the Court.3
I. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION PROCESS IN SUPREME COURT DECISION
MAKING
A. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
The major elements of the SCP at the core of Lawrence are out-
lined in the joint opinion by Justices Souter, O’Connor, and Kennedy
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.4  In that
opinion, the three Justices argued why it was proper for the Supreme
Copyright  2007 by Ronald Kahn.
† [Editor’s Note: Portions of this Essay are drawn from RONALD KAHN, Social
Constructions, Supreme Court Reversals, and American Political Development: Lochner, Plessy,
Bowers, but Not Roe, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 67
(Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006)].
* James Monroe Professor of Politics and Law, Oberlin College.
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (overturning Bowers and
holding that the Due Process Clause protects consenting adults in their right to engage in
private sexual conduct).
3. See RONALD KAHN, Social Constructions, Supreme Court Reversals, and American Political
Development: Lochner, Plessy, Bowers, but Not Roe, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 67 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006) [hereinafter Social
Constructions] (analyzing the importance of the SCP in Supreme Court decision making in
order to elucidate the place of the Supreme Court in American political development).  In
this Essay, I am referring to the originalism of Justices Scalia and Thomas.  I understand
that originalists differ as to whether they base their originalism on the language of the
Constitution as written, or on arguments about the intent of the Framers and/or ratifiers
of the Constitution.
4. 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).
25
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Court to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson,5 find school segregation unconsti-
tutional in Brown v. Board of Education,6 overturn Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital of the District of Columbia7 with its core Lochner era laissez faire
ethos, and abdicate right-of-contract principles in West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish,8 but also why it was improper for the Supreme Court to
overturn Roe v. Wade.9
The Casey Court realized that the factual underpinnings of the
right of abortion choice were moving in the same direction as ex-
panding interpretations of the right of privacy between 1973 and
1992.10  For this reason, the Casey Court concluded that if it were to
overturn Roe, it could not be based on a determination by the Court
that the rights at issue in Roe were no longer valid in light of the ex-
periences of our nation’s citizens.11  To decide otherwise, the Justices
argued, would simply be giving in to political pressure, an act not in
the institutional interests of the Court or the rule of law.12  Thus, as
Casey demonstrates, justices engage in a SCP that considers past prin-
ciples and their application in the world outside the Court, and the
SCP is the core element in a non-originalist vision of the rule of law.13
The SCP includes the following elements: (1) a determination of
whether the rights principles at issue in a case have expanded or de-
clined since prior landmark decisions that involved such rights; (2) a
consideration of these rights principles in light of their application to
the lives of citizens since prior landmark and lesser cases (thus, worka-
bility and citizen reliance on rights are important in determining
whether a right should be sustained); (3) a rejection of the view that
the Court’s determination of the nature of rights and their applica-
tion should simply or primarily be based on levels of political contro-
versy, interest group politics, or public opinion; and (4) analogizing
between contemporary rights principles and their social constructions
and the rights principles and social constructions in prior landmark
and lesser cases (thus increasing the Court’s legitimacy and institu-
tional interests).14
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
8. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 69. R
10. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 867.
13. Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 78. R
14. Id. at 69–70.
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When changes in society and in rights principles and doctrine are
symbiotic, landmark cases will not be overruled; when social construc-
tions in prior landmark cases are no longer tenable, landmark cases
are ripe for serious modification or outright overturning.15  Thus, the
willingness of the Supreme Court to consider changes in rights princi-
ples, such as the Casey Court’s expansion of the rights of personhood
in light of the social constructions of what constitutes such rights since
Roe,16 and, as we shall see, the failure to engage in the SCP in Bowers v.
Hardwick17 is the major reason why that case was overturned in
Lawrence.18
B. Lawrence v. Texas
The importance of the SCP to modern non-originalist Court deci-
sion making is evidenced in Lawrence v. Texas.19 Bowers v. Hardwick
could not be sustained because the Bowers Court had refused to en-
gage in the SCP,20 and when the Lawrence Court did engage in the
SCP, it had not simply to overturn Bowers, but to eviscerate it.21  The
Lawrence Court considers the validity of Bowers in light of two interven-
15. Id. at 72.  Many times there are Supreme Court decisions that signal the possibility
of a landmark case being overturned, such as the cases involving segregation in higher
education prior to Brown.  Also, in many Lochner era cases the right of contract and liberty
under the Due Process Clause did not trump the police powers of government.  See Ron-
ald Kahn, Institutional Norms and the Historical Development of Supreme Court Politics: Changing
“Social Facts” and Doctrinal Development, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 50–59
(Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton eds., 1999), for a discussion of the SCP in death
penalty cases, which has recently resulted in reducing the circumstances where the imposi-
tion of the death penalty is permitted.  Perhaps in the future the Court will reconsider its
failure to socially construct a relationship between government institutions, race, and the
death penalty in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297–99 (1987).  This is a case ripe for
modification or even for overturning.
16. 505 U.S. at 857.
17. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
18. 539 U.S. at 578.
19. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
20. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91.
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79; Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 75.  Rather than R
basing its decision on Due Process right of privacy and personhood grounds, the Lawrence
Court could have found the Texas law banning homosexual sodomy unconstitutional on
Equal Protection grounds, or on more minimalist grounds, such as desuetude.  See Cass R.
Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?: Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003
SUP. CT. REV. 27–33, for an articulation of this argument.  Acceptance of the SCP, in which
rights, principles and social constructions, past and present, are compared through a pro-
cess of analogy, means that considerations by justices as to whether to be minimalist or
maximalist in their decision making are not their first or primary concern. See generally
Ronald Kahn, Why Lawrence v. Texas Was Not Expected: A Critique of Pragmatic Legalist and
Behavioral Explanations of Supreme Court Decision Making, in THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS IN
AMERICA 229 (H. N. Hirsch ed., 2005) (critiquing Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism
as applied to Casey and Lawrence).
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ing cases, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,22 and
Romer v. Evans,23 and finds that they “cast [the Bowers] holding into
even more doubt.”24  The Lawrence Court specifically refers to this crit-
ical social construction regarding the depth of women’s right to abor-
tion choice in Casey.25  There is a specific reaffirmation in Lawrence of
the Casey conditions which must be present in order for the Court to
overturn landmark decisions.26  These conditions required the Law-
rence Court to consider (a) substantive components (principles and
prior social constructions) of what privacy meant prior to Bowers; (b)
what personhood meant in Casey; and (c) what “animosity” meant in
Romer.27
More specifically, the importance of the SCP, in which rights
principles are applied in light of the lives of persons, can be seen in
Lawrence when the Court discusses why it is in the Court’s institutional
interests not simply to follow public opinion, the will of the majority as
expressed by state legislatures, or the history of majority animus
against homosexuals.28  We also see this when the Court explains why
it cannot simply make decisions on a finding that there has been a
moral condemnation of homosexual acts over the years by a majority
of citizens or state legislatures.29  Justice Kennedy, relying on Casey,
notes that the Court’s “obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code.”30  Engaging in the SCP is the way non-
originalists on the Court think about individual rights, a process which
is not a simple application of their personal moral codes.
In Justice O’Connor’s concurrence and in Justice Scalia’s dissent
in Lawrence, we also see the centrality of the SCP to contemporary
non-originalist Supreme Court decision making.  One can see
O’Connor’s commitment to engaging in a robust SCP when she
agrees with her non-originalist colleagues that the Court should not
base its decision simply on accepting the moral disapproval of homo-
sexuals by the legislature or the public: “Moral disapproval of a group
cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protec-
22. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
23. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
24. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
25. Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851); Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 76. R
26. Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 77. R
27. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634); Social Constructions, supra
note 3, at 77. R
28. Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 77. R
29. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)); Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 77. R
30. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850); Social Constructions, supra
note 3, at 77. R
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tion Clause because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’”31  More-
over, O’Connor specifically alludes to the importance of the liberty
interests at stake in the case: “We have been most likely to apply ra-
tional basis review to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause where, as here, the challenged legislation inhibits
personal relationships.”32
Even though O’Connor wants a more toned-down response to
Bowers, one based on the Equal Protection Clause and the substantive
elements in Romer, an analysis of her SCP provides evidence that she
agrees with many of the substantive conclusions at the core of the ma-
jority’s opinion.33  Considering the substantive components of
O’Connor’s analysis of the Texas law with regard to notions of permis-
sibility of majoritarian views of sexuality, personhood, and morality,
and her support of the SCP, there are far more similarities between
O’Connor’s views and the non-originalist Justices in the majority than
there are between O’Connor and the originalists in dissent.34
The most persuasive evidence for the importance of the non-
originalist SCP in contemporary Supreme Court decision making is
the vehement opposition to it by the Court’s originalist Justices,
Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist.  This opposition is most evident in
Scalia’s detailed, determined, and heartfelt dissent in Romer, where he
was prescient in the view that Romer and Bowers could not stand to-
31. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at
633); Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 80. R
32. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580.  This phrase, “the challenged legislation inhibits personal
relationships” implies that Justice O’Connor, like the Lawrence majority, is concerned
about the Due Process liberty interests of homosexuals. Id.; see also Social Constructions,
supra note 3, at 80. R
33. Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 80–81.  O’Connor is not minimalist in her analy- R
sis of the substantive rights at issue in Lawrence.  She is a minimalist only in her conclusion
to base this decision on Equal Protection rather than Due Process grounds.  That is,
O’Connor engaged in a SCP which did not shy away from criticizing key substantive ele-
ments of the Bowers decision, including its key premise that moral disapproval of gays by
government is a rational basis for denying rights. Id. at 81 n.63.
34. Id. at 81.  The depth of O’Connor’s social construction of rights at issue in the anti-
sodomy law raises questions about the argument that we can view O’Connor simply as a
centrist justice because of her views about the judicial role. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE
MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM
199–203 (2004) (arguing that O’Connor’s conception of the role of the judiciary influ-
ences her decision making more than her political leanings).  This view speaks only to
minimalist outcomes, for example, that O’Connor chose not to overturn Bowers and rested
her argument on Equal Protection grounds.  It does not speak to the impact and implica-
tions of her reasoning, including social constructions on future constitutional law. Social
Constructions, supra note 3, at 81 n.64. R
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gether,35 and in Lawrence, where he continued to attack both the con-
ditions laid down in Casey, under which the Supreme Court is to
overturn landmark decisions,36 and its robust SCP.  Here, I concen-
trate on Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence.
In contrast to the non-originalist Justices, Scalia believes that Su-
preme Court decision making is bounded by constitutional principles
that existed at the establishment of the Constitution and its amend-
ments—not those formed by the Court’s subsequent definition of im-
plied fundamental rights.37  He believes that the Court should accept
the policies of legislatures, as long as they do not violate the specific
words of the Constitution, or cannot be directly inferred from those
words.38  Scalia emphasizes that “fundamental rights” must be “so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.”39  This is quite different from what Kennedy said in
his majority opinion in Lawrence: “history and tradition are the starting
point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due pro-
cess inquiry.”40  Scalia also recognizes that the SCP is central to the
Lawrence decision when he argues that one should not believe the ma-
jority opinion when it says the present case “does not involve whether
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.”41  This is because, for Scalia, the
Lawrence decision builds on an illegitimate, decades-long social con-
struction process.  Scalia writes,
If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legiti-
mate state interest” for purposes of proscribing that conduct;
and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neu-
trality), “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring”; what jus-
tification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of
35. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636; Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 82. R
36. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–92 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Social Constructions, supra note
3, at 82. R
37. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598; Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 82. R
38. Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 82. R
39. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993)); Social
Constructions, supra note 3, at 82. R
40. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (majority opinion) (quoting County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
41. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 578 (majority opinion)).  In Romer,
as in Lawrence, Scalia argues that Bowers and Romer can’t stand together, and deplores the
non-originalist Justices’ use of the SCP.  See Romer, 517 U.S. at 640–44 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 82–83. R
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marriage to homosexual couples exercising “[t]he liberty
protected by the Constitution”?42
As in Romer, where Scalia predicted that Bowers and Romer could
not stand together,43 Scalia is predicting here that, if, in my terms, the
SCP that began in Griswold, and was continued in Roe, Casey, rejected
in Bowers, and accepted in Romer and now Lawrence, is allowed to con-
tinue, establishing a right of same-sex marriage under the Constitu-
tion may be just a matter of time.44
Thus, we see the bases for Scalia’s opposition to the Court’s find-
ing that there is “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex.”45  For him, an “emerging aware-
ness” as defined by the non-originalists does not establish a “funda-
mental right.”46  For Scalia, the continued presence of state laws and
arrests for homosexual sodomy offer the only clear evidence that the
protection of such acts is not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition.”47  Scalia’s rejection of a robust SCP as central to his
approach to interpreting the Constitution means that his notion of
what constitutes the mandate of history and tradition is dramatically
different from the non-originalists.48  In viewing the emerging aware-
ness and reliance arguments used in Casey and Lawrence as simply
result-oriented,49  Scalia opposes rights which evolve and are defined
and redefined under the non-originalist SCP.  One sees this when he
seeks the narrowest reading of the Lawrence decision, and refuses to
42. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604–05 (quoting id. at 578, 567 (majority opinion)) (internal
citations omitted).
43. Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604–05; Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 83. R
45. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (majority opinion).
46. Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 83. R
47. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
48. Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 83. R
49. Id.  Part of the opposition by Scalia and the other originalists on the Court to the
Casey decision, and now to the Lawrence decision, is that the right to privacy itself is not
found in the Constitution.  For them, Griswold’s right of privacy was a misinterpretation of
the Constitution, as was the right to an abortion found in Roe. Therefore, according to
these originalists, the right of homosexual sodomy as part of the right of privacy is not a
right protected in the Constitution.  Any SCP which follows Roe, including the SCP out-
lined in Casey, is illegitimate.  These originalists refuse to consider the impact on such
rights of changes in the social, economic, and political world outside the Court since Gris-
wold in 1965 and Roe in 1973.  But Scalia cannot rest his case against homosexual rights on
the view that all rights not specifically stated in the Constitution cannot be fundamental
rights.  Thus, Scalia leaves the door ajar, conceptually, for the Court at times to define such
implied fundamental rights when government is exceptionally abusive of its citizens. Id. at
83 n.73.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-1\MLR104.txt unknown Seq: 8 11-DEC-07 11:25
32 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:25
admit that Casey expanded the basis of abortion choice from a right of
privacy to personhood, and when he refuses to accept the view that a
rule of law can include a changing definition by the Supreme Court of
what constitutes liberty under the Constitution.50  Justice Scalia writes,
More illuminating than this bald, unreasoned disclaimer is
the progression of thought displayed by an earlier passage in
the Court’s opinion, which notes the constitutional protec-
tions afforded to “personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rear-
ing, and education,” and then declares that “[p]ersons in a
homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these pur-
poses, just as heterosexual persons do.”51
Despite claims to the contrary, Scalia engages in a SCP, as do all
originalists.52  For example, Scalia engaged in a SCP when he ap-
proved the Court’s invalidation of anti-miscegenation laws in Loving v.
Virginia:53
In Loving, however, we correctly applied heightened scrutiny,
rather than the usual rational basis review, because the Vir-
ginia statute was “designed to maintain White Supremacy.”
A racially discriminatory purpose is always sufficient to sub-
ject a law to strict scrutiny, even a facially neutral law that
makes no mention of race.54
Scalia seems willing to accept the social construction in Loving
because, even though the Virginia law applied equally to people of all
races, he was willing to view it as the subordination of African Ameri-
cans to whites.55  Scalia’s views on the difference between rejecting the
constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws on the one hand, and ac-
cepting laws criminalizing acts when in engaged in by homosexuals,
but not heterosexuals, suggest that, at some level, all cases pertaining
to individual rights involve a SCP.56
50. Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 83–84. R
51. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (quoting id. at 574 (majority opinion)) (emphasis
omitted).
52. Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 84; see also DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN R
CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 186 (2005) (observing that “[o]riginal
intent itself . . . is not discovered, but rather is constructed by interpretation, and thus
cannot be the ground of objectivity in the sense in which originalism understands it,” and,
thus, finding originalism is not the converse of non-originalism).
53. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
54. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id.; Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 84. R
56. Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 84. R
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All of the Justices, originalist and non-originalist alike, agree to
follow precedent, consider polity and rights principles in making con-
stitutional choices, and engage in analogical reasoning.  All see them-
selves as dealing with the normative and empirical in ways that are
special to courts.  All see themselves as engaging in a process of inter-
pretation.  As I explain elsewhere, both originalists and non-original-
ists acknowledge that Supreme Court decision making has normative
and empirical elements, and that it is both inward and outward look-
ing.57  Where they differ is in their views as to what should be included
in the SCP.  The “external” reference point for many conservative
originalists, like Scalia, is the narrow time frame of the founding pe-
riod.58  Originalists reject the permissibility of the external in Court
decision making moving beyond the founding periods of the Consti-
tution and its amendments.  Thus, for Scalia, and most originalists of
similar viewpoint, the manner in which privacy, personhood, and ho-
mosexual rights have developed is not principled because in their view
the rights principles under the Due Process Clauses of privacy-
personhood since Griswold do not reflect principles in the Constitu-
tion, and thus any social constructions from those principles that re-
flect the lives of citizens are illegitimate.59
It is the strict limitation that originalist Justices such as Scalia
place on the SCP which differentiates their jurisprudence from that of
the non-originalist Justices.60  Thus, the set of parameters as to the
nature of the SCP, and its place in the Court’s effort to define individ-
ual rights, is radically different for Scalia (and Justices Thomas and
Rehnquist) as compared to non-originalists on the Supreme Court.61
This difference has been a defining fissure of the mature Rehnquist
Court and it will continue to be one on the Roberts Court.62
II. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION PROCESS AND ORIGINALISM IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The importance of the differences between originalists and non-
originalists with regard to what constitutes an appropriate SCP in con-
temporary implied fundamental rights cases, and the acceptance of a
robust SCP by conservatives and moderates, not simply liberals, on the
Supreme Court, has important implications with regard to the rela-
57. Id. at 90.
58. Id. at 90–91.
59. Id. at 91.
60. Id. at 84–85.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 85.  It also has become a defining fissure in contemporary American politics.
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tionship between originalism and the living Constitution in the
twenty-first century.  First, it helps explain why a conservative/moder-
ate Supreme Court in a conservative political era expands the juris-
prudential basis for the right of abortion choice—moving from a
concept of privacy to one of personhood—and why rights of per-
sonhood under the Constitution have been robustly extended to
homosexuals in the dramatic and unexpected rights-expanding deci-
sion in Lawrence v. Texas.63
The second implication of my argument is that the primary
fissure on the mature Rehnquist Court, with regard to the treatment
of implied fundamental rights is between originalists and non-
originalists over the level of robustness of the SCP, not differences
among conservatives, moderates and liberal Justices.  For non-original-
ists of all ideological stripes, and liberal originalist scholars, such as
Jack Balkin, the SCP is central to a modern rule of law and a basis for
the Supreme Court’s legitimacy and uniqueness among governmental
institutions; for originalists it undermines the Supreme Court as a le-
gal institution.64
The presence of a robust SCP in the decision making of non-
originalist Justices of all stripes raises serious questions about the im-
portance of efforts by constitutional theorists to develop liberal-
progressive originalist constitutional theories, not just those by Justice
Scalia who seeks to bolster conservative ones.  This is so because at the
core of modern implied fundamental rights doctrine, and in other
areas of constitutional doctrine, is the development and application of
rights principles through engaging in a SCP, a process that is far re-
moved from the premises and intentions that jurists and scholars have
constructed as occurring in the founding period.65  The importance
63. See RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 1953–1993,
at 257–59 (1994) (detailing the Court’s use of the SCP in expanding privacy rights and
basing its affirmation of the abortion right on the right to personhood); Ronald Kahn,
Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Decision-Making: The Rehnquist Court on Privacy and Re-
ligion, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 175–98 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman
eds., 1999) (same); see also Mark Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Wel-
fare, and Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (1997) (arguing that abortion
rights have more staying power than rights of basic welfare because of the intellectual
proclivities of liberal constitutional theorists and law professors).
64. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Research Paper Series, Paper No. 128, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=925558.
65. Perhaps the best example of this point is that most of the First Amendment speech
doctrine is a product of post-1917 Espionage Act developments. See KEN I. KERSCH, FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 114–19 (2003) (detailing the evolu-
tion of expanded First Amendment rights as partially rooted in post-1917 Espionage Act
cases).
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of the SCP also raises questions about the importance of constitu-
tional theories that argue for popular constitutionalism, such as those
of Mark Tushnet and Larry D. Kramer, which seek to take the Consti-
tution away from the courts.66  Moreover, the presence of a robust
social construction process as seen in Casey and Lawrence raises serious
questions about the importance of constitutional theories that oppose
maximalist and support minimalist Supreme Court decision making,
such as that of Cass Sunstein.67
I question whether such attempts will have a serious impact on
Supreme Court decision making in the future.  If originalist and prag-
matic principles are not central to implied fundamental rights cases
like Casey and Lawrence which were decided by a moderate-
conservative Supreme Court in a conservative age, one can ask
whether they will have an impact on Court decision making in far less
controversial areas of constitutional law.
Finally, in such a setting, the role of the SCP in Court decision
making and the conflicts between originalists and non-originalists are
closely linked to the place of the Supreme Court in American political
development.  There is a feedback effect from conflicts between
originalists and non-originalists over the SCP on the Court to more
general American politics.68  This suggests that the bi-directionality
between the internal Court and the world outside occurs at several
levels, at the level of the lived lives of citizens as the Court makes deci-
sions about rights of privacy and personhood as we see in the SCP,
and at the level of politics itself.69  Thus, there is a feedback effect
between differences on the Court over the legitimacy of a robust SCP.
The Court’s differences are not simply over controversial Court deci-
sions, such as Roe, Casey and Lawrence; they are over the nature of the
Court’s decision-making process and the place of the Supreme Court
in American political development.
66. See Ronald Kahn, The Constitution Restoration Act, Judicial Independence, and Popular
Constitutionalism, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1083 (2006), for a critique of Mark Tushnet’s
theory of popular constitutionalism.  I argue that the SCP provides a direct relationship
between the Supreme Court and the lived lives of citizens, a process that may make the
Supreme Court more democratic substantively (if not procedurally) than the more directly
politically accountable institutions which Tushnet favors as forums for making constitu-
tional choices. See also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTION-
ALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
67. See Sunstein, supra note 21. R
68. Social Constructions, supra note 3, at 95. R
69. Id.
